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On May 19, 1988, the Court of Appeals entered its decision
affirming the trial court's order.

Eugene L. Perry, Appellant

in this matter, files this Petition for Rehearing.

I. UTAH LAW REQUIRES THE COURT OF APPEALS TO VIEW THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT.
Mr. Perry appealed the probate court's refusal to vacate
its December 3, 1985 Order as being void for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

The lower Court entered a Memorandum

Decision (R. 156 167) and two Orders (R. 190-192; 293-294).
There was never an evidentiary hearing, nor did the Court ever
enter any findings of fact.

Under these circumstances, the

Court of Appeals, at a minimum, should not rely upon any
disputed facts in reaching its conclusion.

As the Supreme

Court has stated:

The right to resort to the courts for the
adjudication of grievances and the
settlement of disputes is a fundamental
one. An indispensable requisite to
fulfilling that responsibility is the
determination of questions of fact upon
which there is a disagreement.
LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420
P.2d 615, 616 (1966) (reversing bench trial judgment where
findings not entered under U.R.C.P. Rule 52); emphasis added.
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Moreover, under Rule 41(b), where the trial court dismisses an
action without entering findings of fact, the Supreme Court has
held that the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light
most favorable to the appellant,
2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960).

Davis v. Payne & Day, 10 Utah

See also Utah Steel & Iron Co. v.

Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 P.2d 1019 (1970) (motion to dismiss
judged on basis of whether any facts would support claim).

The

Court of Appeals has violated this fundamental principle in
this case.

A. The Probate Court did not find that the
McLaughlins were Interested Persons.
The Court's actions can, in addition, be
defended as Kent McLaughlin is an interested
person as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 75-1
201(20) (1978), with full power to ask for
affirmative relief from the court, as he has
a $2,500 equitable lien in the decedent's
home. He is also the legal and natural
guardian of the children of the deceased,
who are beneficiaries of the estate and
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105, he may
invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
Opinion at 6, footnote 7.

The lower court never entered any

finding of fact to this effect.

Both parties acknowledged that

the "meaning [of the term 'interested person'] as it relates to
particular persons may vary from time to time and must be
determined according to the particular purposes of, and matters
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involved in, any proceeding."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(20)

(1978); Respondent's Brief at 11-12; Appellant's Brief at 15-16.
Where Mr. Perry disputes that Mr. McLaughlin is an
"interested person" for purposes of the hearing, the Court
should view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr.
Perry.

Davis, 348 P.2d at 338.

That evidence shows (1) Mr.

McLaughlin acted contrary to the position of his children
(refused to waive his equitable lien —

R. 55-56), (2) he never

purported to act on their behalf (see e.g. the order prepared
by counsel for McLaughlins which gave them unfettered ownership
of the home and furnishings —

R. 72-75), (3) his equitable

lien would have been substantially higher but for the fact that
it was reduced as an offset for failure to pay child support
for these two children (R.50-53) and (4) his only interest as a
creditor was insuring that he was paid his $2,500 equitable
lien.

As to this final point, the Court should note that (1)

he was not a general creditor of the estate (R.50-53; Utah Code
Arm. § 75-1-201(4) (1973); In Re Estate of Malliet, 649 P.2d 18
(Utah 1982) (disputes over specific real property are not
"claims" under the claims statutes); and (2) his interest in
the Estate would not have been sufficient to allow him to
demand that the personal representative post a bond.
Ann. § 75-3-605 (1985).

Utah Code

Viewing the facts most favorably to

Mr. Perry, Mr. McLaughlin would be an interested person for
- 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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purposes of objecting to the waiver of his equitable lien, but
not for the purpose of bidding on the home or the furnishings.
Nothing about his equitable lien would extend his interest to
acquiring estate property.

In any event, the court below made

no factual finding that Mr. McLaughlin was an interested
person; it is improper for this court to rule on this point as
if it were reviewing findings of fact after an evidentiary
hearing.

LeGrand Johnson Corporation, 420 P.2d at 616.

B. The Lower Court has Never Ruled that the
McLauohlings are Entitled to the Disputed Furnishings.
The Court states that Judge Hanson "also ruled that the
December 3, 1985 Order entitled the McLaughlins to the
furnishings even though they did not purchase the home.'1
Opinion at 3.

This is contrary to the record.

The Order to Show Cause was heard by Judge Rigtrup.
131-132.

R.

Mr. Perry unsuccessfully attempted to consolidate all

of the proceedings before Judge Hanson.

R. 109-114, 241. As a

result, this issue was never presented to Judge Hanson.

See

Record generally; R. 220-221.
This is shown by what took place after the Court1s orally
denied the Rule 59(a) motion at the April 7, 1986 hearing.
McLaughlins submitted a proposed order.
objected and submitted a proposed order.

R. 295-296.

The

Mr. Perry

R. 289-290; 293-294.
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While there were some stylistic differences between the orders,
the only substantive difference was the inclusion in the
McLaughlins1 order of the following language:
. . •

"the Court

determined . . . that the McLaughlin's [sic] are legally

(entitled to the personal property in question . . •.M
R. 295-296,

The Court signed Mr. Perry's order.

R. 293-294.

Thus, the Court recognized that it would be a violation of Mr.
Perry's due process rights to rule on that matter when it was
pending before another judge and in view of the fact that Mr.
Perry had never presented any argument to Judge Hanson on the
merits of that issue.

R. 220-221.

The Court should excise this statement from the opinion to
insure that there is no future rejudice to Mr. Perry on the
merits of the underlying dispute.

C. Mr. McLaughlin Did Not Object to the Petition to
Sell the Home and Furniture.
"Prior to the hearing, Kent McLaughlin filed an objection
to Perry's petition to sell the family home to the Arnauds."
Opinion at 1-2.

Mr. McLaughlin never objected to the sale of

the home; he objected only to the waiver of his equitable lien
in the home.

R. 55-56.

- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II-

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS FAILED TO APPLY UTAH LAW ON

THE ISSUE RAISED.

Mr. Perry has raised the question of whether, under Utah
law, the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant
affirmative relief to a person who did not qualify as an
interested person under the probate code.

The Court's decision

does not address either of the Utah cases cited by Mr. Perry in
support of his claim.

Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d

165 (Utah 1983); Matter of Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 803
(Utah 1987).
In Estate of Anderson, the Supreme Court ruled that an
order invalidating a protected person's will and enjoining the
execution of a new will without prior court approval was void
because the court "exceeded its powers of adjudication."
Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168.

Notwithstanding the

general grant of power to the probate court under Section
75-1-302 ("the court has jurisdiction over all subject matter
relating to: . . . incapacitated persons . . . " ) , the Supreme
Court analyzed the issue in terms of Section 75-5-408 —

the

section which specifically sets forth the powers of the probate
court in conservatorship matters.
(1978).

Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-408

Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168.

Because that

section excepts from the Court's power the "power to make a
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will," the Court ruled that invalidation of an existing will
prior to death and enjoining the execution of a will without
court approval exceeded the court's powers of adjudication.
Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168-69.
Section 75-1-302 gives the probate court the same general
jurisdiction over estates as it does over incapacitated
persons.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302 (1978).

In the case at

bar, the Court's analysis started and finished with Section
75-1-302.

Opinion at 5.

The Court did not analyze the probate

statute comparable to Section 75-5-408.
entitled:
—

"Proceedings affecting devolution and administration

jurisdiction of subject matter."

(1978).

Section 75-3-105 is

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105

The statute then provides "[plersons interested in

decedent's estates may . . . petition the court for orders
. . .." The Supreme Court has quite logically equated the
people who have standing to seek court orders in probate
matters to be those who are "interested persons" as defined by
Section 75-1-201 (20). Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d at 805.
Thus, the probate court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the petitions of non-interested persons.
The Court relied heavily on Mr. Perry's actions at the
hearing, his involvement with the preparation of the challenged
order and the fact that it was he that petitioned the court.

- 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Opinion at 2, 5 and 6,

Estate of Anderson also shows that this

reliance is misplaced.

In Estate of Anderson, the party

seeking to avoid the order stipulated its entry into the
record.

Moreover, a separate part of the order in that case

was found to be valid.

Thus, the Anderson court had

jurisdiction generally to entertain the petition of the
parties; it violated its jurisdictional authority only when
part of the order entered exceeded the court's statutory
grant.

Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168-169.

In a similar

fashion, the probate court in this case had authority to hear
the petition of Mr. Perry, but it "exceeded in powers of
adjudication" when it granted relief to the McLaughlins.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS VIOLATED FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN ANALYZING THE REPEAL OF SECTION
75-3-710(3) .
The Court of Appeals found no significance in the repeal of
Section 75-3-710(3) because it was "duplicative of the other
broader authority granted to the court under the" probate
code.

Opinion at 6.

"It is an elementary rule of construction

that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause
and sentence of a statute."

Sutherland Stat. Const. § 46.06

(4th Ed. 1984) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
Utah Supreme Court has stated:

As the

"We construe a statute on the

- 8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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assumption that each term is used advisedly and that the intent
of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the
context and structure in which it is placed."
Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984).

Ward v.
The Court's

treatment of Section 75-3-710(3) ignored both the common law's
"elementary rule of construction" and the Utah Supreme Court's
assumption.

Mr. Perry carefully analyzed the relevant sections

of the Uniform Probate Code, the accompanying joint editorial
board comments of the Uniform Laws Commissioners (whose
addition to the Utah Code Annotated was authorized by the
Legislature) and the Supreme Court's decision in Estate of
Peterson.

Appellant's Brief at 19-24.

His analysis shows

Section 75-3-710(3), prior to its repeal, was unique as the
only section of the Utah Uniform Probate Code which permitted a
non interested person to seek affirmative relief from the
probate court.

By its actions in 1977, the Legislature's

intended this result.

This is shown by the fact that Section

75-3-710(3) was added to the Uniform Probate Code by the Utah
Legislature (Compare Uniform Probate Code § 3-711) and by the
fact that Section 75-3-710(3) is consistent with how Utah law
treated sales of estate property prior to the enactment of the
Uniform Probate Code.

See Utah Code Ann. § 75-10-1 et al.; in

particular § 75-10-15 (repealed 1977).
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The Court's concern that a self interested personal
representative "could prevent the court, in selling property,
from maximizing the estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries
and creditors" (Opinion at 6) is misguided.

A self interested

personal representative can sell property without court order.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710 (1983).

The sale could only then be

attacked by an interested person who would have to show that
there was a "substantial conflict of interest" to void the
sale.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105 (1978); § 75-3-712 (1978).

The interested person could also seek damages if the personal
representative breached its duties.
(1978).

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-711

The Court's opinion is written from the perspective of

a shepherd caring for the flock; not from the prospective
intended by the Uniform Probate Code:

This section and others in Chapter 3 describe a system
of administration of decedents' estates which gives
interested persons control of whether matters relating
to estates will become occasions for judicial orders.
. . . Nothing except self-interest will compel resort
to the judge. When resort to the judge is necessary
or desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain
protection, the scope of the proceeding if not
otherwise prescribed by the Code is framed bv the
petition.
Editorial Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-106; emphasis
added.
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The probate court acts only at the direction of interested
persons for their benefit and protection.

If interested

persons choose not to contest the actions of the personal
representative, the probate court has no jurisdiction to act on
its own.
Even if the Court affirms its ruling, it would be a far
better result to limit that ruling to the concept that Mr.
Perry's complaint goes to a procedural defect rather than a
jurisdictional error.

Opinion 3-5.

As written, the Court's

opinion unfortunately and unnecessarily tramples the underlying
philosophy of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

RELIEF REQUESTED

If the Court agrees that Mr. McLaughlin

must be an

interested person for purposes of the hearing on November 7,
1985 and the subsequent Order of December 3, 1985, Mr. Perry
requests that the Court remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings to determine by an evidentiary hearing
whether Mr. McLaughlin is an "interested person."

1

Mr. Perry agrees with the Court's point made during oral
argument that, assuming his position is correct, if either of
the McLaughlins is an "interested person," the probate court
had jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief to both of them.
- 11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CERTIFICATION
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Dated June 2, 1988.

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

Charles M. Bennett
Attorneys for Appellant,
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Representative of the Estate
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